How traditional, command, market and mixed economies decide what to make
Grade 12 Social Studies Worksheet

Circle the best answer.
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Cards A to C on two policies in Port Wren (example figures, made up for practice). Card A, "Rents in Port Wren". Table, columns Monthly rent | Apartments wanted | Apartments offered within a year | Apartments offered within five years: $1,400 | 12,000 | 9,000 | 7,000; $1,600 | 11,000 | 9,500 | 8,500; $1,800 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000. The market rent is $1,800. The council caps rents at $1,400. Card B, "A landlord's choice under the cap". A repair costing $120 a month would let an apartment rent for $200 a month more in an open market. Under the cap the rent stays $1,400 either way, and the apartment still fills. Card C, "A school voucher". Each family may spend a $9,000 voucher at any school that accepts it. Public schools receive $11,000 a student from taxes and lose it for each student who leaves. About 1,000 Port Wren students already attend private schools, paying their own tuition.
Milo reads card A in the cap's first year. What signal stops working in Port Wren, and who bears the cost?
- A rising rent can no longer ration or draw units: 3,000 households find none, while 9,000 pay $400 less
- The cap signals owners to offer more, since tenants now have more money left to spend on rent
- No signal is lost: the 9,000 apartments still fill, so the market still clears at $1,400
- The price signal: 12,000 households now rent at $1,400, each paying $400 less than before
Pia compares card A's two columns of apartments offered. How does the cap's effect change over five years?
- The shortage grows from 3,000 to 5,000 as owners convert or stop building, so fewer renters gain
- The shortage stays at 3,000, since the number of households who want apartments stays the same
- The shortage shrinks, since owners adjust to the cap over time and stop leaving the market
- The cap helps more renters over time, since rents stay $400 below the market rent for five years
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Cards A to C on efficiency and equity (card A is real data; card B is a summary in our words; card C is made up for practice). Card A, "Output and inequality in seven countries, 2022". Who made it: the World Bank, World Development Indicators, read November 14, 2026. Table, columns Country | GDP per person, PPP, 2021 international dollars | Gini index: United States | 72,829 | 41.7; Denmark | 69,090 | 29.3; Germany | 63,778 | 33.7; France | 53,674 | 31.2; Slovenia | 47,059 | 24.3; Poland | 43,405 | 28.9; Chile | 29,561 | 43.2. Note in our words: GDP per person is output per resident, adjusted for price levels; the Gini index runs from 0 (everyone has the same income) to 100 (one person has it all) and comes from household surveys that differ somewhat by country. Card B, "Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (1975)". Summary in our words, not a quotation: Okun pictured money taxed from richer families and carried to poorer ones in a leaky bucket. Some leaks out on the way: the cost of running the program, and the work, saving and investing that taxes and benefits discourage. How much leakage to accept is a value judgment about equality, not a fact that data can settle. Card C, "A plan for Fenmoor (made up)". Fenmoor would tax 1,000 higher-income households $1,000 each. Of the $1,000,000, $700,000 would reach 2,000 lower-income households, $350 each; the other $300,000 leaks to running costs and to work that the taxes discourage.
Ari sets Denmark beside the United States on card A, using card B. Which statement best captures the trade-off the two cards show?
- Denmark has the better system, since it is nearly as rich as the United States and far more equal
- Denmark's equality makes it richer, since the more equal countries on card A have higher output
- The United States is more efficient, since its output per person is the highest of all seven countries on card A
- If its programs cause Denmark's 5 percent lower output, that is the leak paid for a Gini 12 points lower
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Cards A to C on two bus makers in Tallis (card A is a summary in our words; cards B and C are made up for practice). Card A, "János Kornai, 'The Soft Budget Constraint' (Kyklos, 1986)". Summary in our words, not a quotation: A firm faces a hard budget constraint when losses can end it. It faces a soft one when it expects the state to cover its losses with grants, cheap loans or tax relief. Kornai argued that a soft constraint weakens a manager's reasons to cut costs, to fit output to what buyers want and to take care with new investment. Card B, "Two bus makers over five years". Table, columns Firm | Owner | Losses covered by the state | Buses made a year | Cost per bus | Unsold buses at year's end: North Works | the state | every year | 1,200 | $310,000 | 180; Ridge Motors | private owners | never | 900 | $260,000 | 20. Card C, "A claim". A council member says: "North Works makes more buses, so state ownership puts more of our resources to work for the public."
Bo combines cards A and B. Which explanation of the gap between the two bus makers do the cards best support?
- Covered losses soften North Works' budget, which fits its higher cost per bus and 180 unsold buses
- Ridge Motors costs less because private owners pay lower wages, as card A says private firms do
- North Works makes 300 more buses than Ridge, so its larger size explains why it leaves more of them unsold
- The cards show that state-owned firms will cost more to run than private firms do, wherever they are
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Cards A to C on two policies in Port Wren (example figures, made up for practice). Card A, "Rents in Port Wren". Table, columns Monthly rent | Apartments wanted | Apartments offered within a year | Apartments offered within five years: $1,400 | 12,000 | 9,000 | 7,000; $1,600 | 11,000 | 9,500 | 8,500; $1,800 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 10,000. The market rent is $1,800. The council caps rents at $1,400. Card B, "A landlord's choice under the cap". A repair costing $120 a month would let an apartment rent for $200 a month more in an open market. Under the cap the rent stays $1,400 either way, and the apartment still fills. Card C, "A school voucher". Each family may spend a $9,000 voucher at any school that accepts it. Public schools receive $11,000 a student from taxes and lose it for each student who leaves. About 1,000 Port Wren students already attend private schools, paying their own tuition.
The landlord on card B weighs the $120 repair. Jun compares the choice with and without the cap. Which prediction fits the margin best?
- With the cap the repair is still made, since the landlord gains $200 − $120 = $80 a month from it
- The cap makes no difference at the margin, since the apartment fills and earns $1,400 either way
- The repair is skipped either way, since landlords under any rule try to keep their costs low
- With the cap the repair adds $120 of cost and nothing in rent, so it is skipped; without it, it pays $80
Card C's voucher starts. Kira considers a family choosing between a public school and a private one charging $11,000. What changes at the margin, and who bears the cost?
- Taxpayers save $2,000 on every voucher, including those used by the 1,000 students already in private school
- The family's extra cost of going private falls from $11,000 to $2,000; the public school loses $11,000
- The voucher costs taxpayers nothing new, since the money simply follows each student to a school
- Nothing changes for this family, since the $9,000 voucher is worth less than the private school's $11,000
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Cards A to C on efficiency and equity (card A is real data; card B is a summary in our words; card C is made up for practice). Card A, "Output and inequality in seven countries, 2022". Who made it: the World Bank, World Development Indicators, read November 14, 2026. Table, columns Country | GDP per person, PPP, 2021 international dollars | Gini index: United States | 72,829 | 41.7; Denmark | 69,090 | 29.3; Germany | 63,778 | 33.7; France | 53,674 | 31.2; Slovenia | 47,059 | 24.3; Poland | 43,405 | 28.9; Chile | 29,561 | 43.2. Note in our words: GDP per person is output per resident, adjusted for price levels; the Gini index runs from 0 (everyone has the same income) to 100 (one person has it all) and comes from household surveys that differ somewhat by country. Card B, "Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff (1975)". Summary in our words, not a quotation: Okun pictured money taxed from richer families and carried to poorer ones in a leaky bucket. Some leaks out on the way: the cost of running the program, and the work, saving and investing that taxes and benefits discourage. How much leakage to accept is a value judgment about equality, not a fact that data can settle. Card C, "A plan for Fenmoor (made up)". Fenmoor would tax 1,000 higher-income households $1,000 each. Of the $1,000,000, $700,000 would reach 2,000 lower-income households, $350 each; the other $300,000 leaks to running costs and to work that the taxes discourage.
A writer argues from card B that any tax-and-transfer program shrinks output, so no country should run one. Luz looks for the strongest objection the cards allow. Which is it?
- Equality matters more than output, so the size of the leak should not count in the choice
- Denmark's output per person is above Germany's and France's, so its taxes cannot carry any cost
- Okun's leak is the cost of running the program alone, which is small in most countries
- A leak means poorer families get less than richer ones lose; whether that is worth it depends on its size
A student claims card A proves that equality costs output, because more equal countries are poorer. Noah tests the claim against all seven rows. What is the best verdict?
- Not shown: Chile is least equal and poorest, Denmark equal and rich; one year cannot show cause
- Shown: Slovenia and Poland, the two most equal, are among the three poorest countries on the card
- Not shown: the Gini index is a measure of output, so it cannot be compared with GDP per person
- Shown: the United States is the richest and among the least equal, so inequality raises output
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Cards A to C on two bus makers in Tallis (card A is a summary in our words; cards B and C are made up for practice). Card A, "János Kornai, 'The Soft Budget Constraint' (Kyklos, 1986)". Summary in our words, not a quotation: A firm faces a hard budget constraint when losses can end it. It faces a soft one when it expects the state to cover its losses with grants, cheap loans or tax relief. Kornai argued that a soft constraint weakens a manager's reasons to cut costs, to fit output to what buyers want and to take care with new investment. Card B, "Two bus makers over five years". Table, columns Firm | Owner | Losses covered by the state | Buses made a year | Cost per bus | Unsold buses at year's end: North Works | the state | every year | 1,200 | $310,000 | 180; Ridge Motors | private owners | never | 900 | $260,000 | 20. Card C, "A claim". A council member says: "North Works makes more buses, so state ownership puts more of our resources to work for the public."
Zee asks who bears the cost of North Works' covered losses, using cards A and B. Which answer fits best?
- No one, since the losses go to the state, which owns North Works and so pays itself back
- Ridge Motors' owners, since card A says the state charges private firms to cover the losses
- Bus riders, since North Works' cost of $310,000 a bus is passed on to them in higher fares
- Taxpayers or lenders to the state, and whoever would have used those funds for something else
Esme looks for the strongest objection to the council member's claim on card C. Which is it?
- Ridge Motors earns a profit at $260,000 a bus, which shows its buses are the ones the public wants
- State ownership wastes resources wherever it is tried, so North Works should be sold at once
- Ridge Motors makes 900 buses, so the two firms together already meet the public's need
- Output counts buses made, not used: 180 sit unsold, and each costs $50,000 more than Ridge's