Freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition, and their limits
Grade 12 Social Studies Worksheet - Challenge Me

Circle the best answer.
Read this first
Use this
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), in our words: In December 1965, students wore black armbands to school to protest the fighting in Vietnam. The school had adopted a rule against armbands, and the students were suspended. The Court ruled 7 to 2 for the students. It wrote: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." It said the armbands could be banned only if they would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988), quoted from the Court's opinion: "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The Court held 5 to 3 for the school, which had removed articles from a student newspaper produced in a journalism class.
Jun reads cards TK and HK. How do Tinker and Hazelwood differ?
- Both let schools ban any speech they think harmful, whatever the circumstances the school faces
- Hazelwood overruled Tinker, so schools now control any student speech in any setting, sponsored or not
- Tinker: a student's own speech unless it disrupts. Hazelwood: schools may edit sponsored work
- Tinker covers printed writing such as papers and Hazelwood covers armbands and signs
Use this
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), in our words: In December 1965, students wore black armbands to school to protest the fighting in Vietnam. The school had adopted a rule against armbands, and the students were suspended. The Court ruled 7 to 2 for the students. It wrote: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." It said the armbands could be banned only if they would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988), quoted from the Court's opinion: "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." The Court held 5 to 3 for the school, which had removed articles from a student newspaper produced in a journalism class. Case C3 (made-up): A student hands out the student's own flyer on the sidewalk by the school, not sponsored by the school. The principal bans it because it criticizes the lunch menu. Nothing is disrupted.
Luz reads cards TK and HK and case C3. The principal bans the student's own flyer about the lunch menu. Which rule controls?
- Tinker's: the school needs evidence of material and substantial interference
- Hazelwood's: any pedagogical concern the principal names will do
- Neither, since school grounds are outside the First Amendment altogether
- Tinker bars any punishment of student speech, so no ban is possible here
Use this
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), in our words: A Montgomery, Alabama, official sued the New York Times over an advertisement that had errors, and a jury awarded him $500,000. The Court unanimously reversed. It held that a public official may win a libel case only by proving "actual malice": "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Milo reads card SU. Why does an actual malice rule protect public debate?
- Fear of paying for honest mistakes would make critics cautious, shrinking public debate
- Officials are not protected by libel law, so critics may say anything
- False statements about officials are valuable to debate, so they deserve protection
- The press rarely makes mistakes, so the rule costs officials very little
Use this
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), in our words: A Montgomery, Alabama, official sued the New York Times over an advertisement that had errors, and a jury awarded him $500,000. The Court unanimously reversed. It held that a public official may win a libel case only by proving "actual malice": "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Case C5 (made-up): Paper A falsely accuses a mayor of theft after its editor checks records and trusted sources. Paper B prints the same accusation after its editor learns it is false.
Noah reads card SU and case C5. Which paper's statement can support a libel claim by the mayor?
- Paper A's, since any false statement about an official can support a claim
- Both papers, since each printed a false accusation against the mayor
- Neither, since the First Amendment protects false statements about officials
- Paper B's, which printed a statement the editor knew was false
Use this
New York Times v. United States (1971), quoted from the Court's opinion: "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." It added that the Government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Background: the Government asked courts to stop newspapers from printing a secret study of the Vietnam war; the Court ruled for the newspapers, 6 to 3.
Pia reads card NY. The Government claims national security justifies stopping a story. What does the "heavy burden" mean?
- National security claims automatically win, since the Government decides what is secret
- Publication is protected without exception, so the Government cannot win
- The press must show that no harm would follow before it may publish a story
- The Government must show justification; the claim alone does not settle the question
Use this
Schenck v. United States (1919), in our words: Charles Schenck and others mailed leaflets to men who had passed draft boards, urging them not to submit to the draft. He was convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Court upheld the conviction. Justice Holmes wrote for the Court: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), quoted: "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Background: Ohio had fined Brandenburg $1,000 under its criminal syndicalism law for a speech at a rally. The Court struck the law.
Tala reads cards SC and BR. What new burden does Brandenburg put on the government?
- To show the speaker belongs to a group that has broken the law before in the same state
- To show just that the speech might lead to harm at some later time
- To show the speech is aimed at imminent lawless action and likely to produce it
- To show the speech actually caused a crime after the speaker finished speaking to the crowd
Use this
Schenck v. United States (1919), quoted: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), quoted: "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Background: Ohio had fined Brandenburg $1,000 under its criminal syndicalism law for a speech at a rally. The Court struck the law. Case C8 (made-up): A person falsely shouts that a building is on fire, to start a panic in a crowded hall.
Zee reads cards CT and BR and case C8. Does Brandenburg undercut the "fire in a theatre" example?
- Yes; Brandenburg overturned each sentence of the Schenck opinion, including this one
- No, but solely because Brandenburg does not mention theaters, so it leaves the example alone
- Yes; Brandenburg protects false statements, so a false alarm would be protected
- No; a false alarm meant to start a panic fits imminent harm, which the test still reaches
Use this
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), in our words: A Montgomery, Alabama, official sued the New York Times over an advertisement that had errors, and a jury awarded him $500,000. The Court unanimously reversed. It held that a public official may win a libel case only by proving "actual malice": "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Editorial (made-up): "Because the First Amendment protects debate on public issues, newspapers should never be sued for what they print about officials."
Ari reads card SU and editorial C10. What does the editorial assume?
- That protecting debate requires protecting even knowing falsehoods
- That officials have no reputation to protect, which card SU also assumes
- That the press should be liable for each error, however honest it was
- That the First Amendment applies solely to newspapers and not to individuals
Use this
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), in our words: In December 1965, students wore black armbands to school to protest the fighting in Vietnam. The school had adopted a rule against armbands, and the students were suspended. The Court ruled 7 to 2 for the students. It wrote: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." It said the armbands could be banned only if they would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." New York Times v. United States (1971), quoted from the Court's opinion: "Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." It added that the Government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Background: the Government asked courts to stop newspapers from printing a secret study of the Vietnam war; the Court ruled for the newspapers, 6 to 3.
Bo reads cards TK and NY. What idea do Tinker's test and the "heavy burden" share?
- Speech is protected solely when most people find it acceptable
- The government, not the speaker, must justify limiting speech
- Courts defer to officials on speech whenever officials claim a danger
- Speakers must show their speech is harmless before they may speak
Use this
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), in our words: A Montgomery, Alabama, official sued the New York Times over an advertisement that had errors, and a jury awarded him $500,000. The Court unanimously reversed. It held that a public official may win a libel case only by proving "actual malice": "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), in our words: In December 1965, students wore black armbands to school to protest the fighting in Vietnam. The school had adopted a rule against armbands, and the students were suspended. The Court ruled 7 to 2 for the students. It wrote: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." It said the armbands could be banned only if they would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." Argument (made-up): "If most voters want a view silenced, the government should silence it, because democracy is majority rule."
Esme reads cards SU and TK and argument C12. Which reply do the cards support?
- The argument is right, since Congress represents the majority and the text names Congress
- Protection for speech limits what majorities may do, including to unpopular views
- Brandenburg lets majorities ban any speech they dislike if enough voters support the ban
- The quotes apply solely to popular speech, so a majority may silence a view it dislikes