The Great Depression: causes and how people lived through it
Grade 11 Social Studies Worksheet

Circle the best answer.
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Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card A, the gold standard and the Fed (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): The international gold standard linked interest rates and monetary policies among the nations that took part in it. The Fed's rate increases of 1928 and 1929 therefore triggered recessions in countries around the world. The Fed's history adds that some officials judged that defending the gold standard by raising rates was better for the economy than aiding ailing banks.
Card A says the Fed's rate rises of 1928 and 1929 triggered recessions in countries around the world. What does that show about the Depression, Milo asks?
- The gold standard caused the stock crash, since other nations followed the Fed's rate rises
- The United States caused the whole world's downturn, since the Fed raised rates first
- Other nations raised rates because they feared the crash, which then spread the downturn back to the United States
- A policy choice in one country spread abroad through the gold standard, so the downturn was not only American
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Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card B, two views of bank failures (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): Some Fed leaders followed Bagehot's rule that a central bank should lend to solvent banks in a panic. Others held a "liquidationist" view that weak institutions should be let fail, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon advocated it. The Fed's history says modern monetary scholars believe the Fed could have stemmed the contraction, and that its expansions of the monetary base in 1931 and 1932 were "too little and too late." It also calls the Fed's efforts "well intentioned and based on the best available information."
Mellon advocated letting weak banks fail; Bagehot's rule was to lend to solvent banks in a panic. Which fact in card C would a Bagehot supporter cite, Noah asks?
- The money supply fell nearly 30 percent, which shows banks failed because they were weak
- Deposit insurance began in 1934, which shows lending in a panic was not needed
- More than 9,000 banks failed in four years, which suggests the failures went unchecked
- Just nine banks failed in 1934, which shows letting banks fail works
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Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card C, banks, 1930 to 1934 (Summary in our words, not a quotation): Banks outside the Federal Reserve System had little access to cash in a crisis. From the fall of 1930 through the winter of 1933 the money supply fell by nearly 30 percent, and prices fell with it. President Roosevelt ordered all banking transactions suspended on March 6, 1933, and banks reopened from March 13. Some 4,000 banks that closed in 1933 never reopened. Deposit insurance began on January 1, 1934, with coverage up to $2,500 an account. Only nine banks failed in 1934, compared with more than 9,000 in the four years before.
Card C says more than 9,000 banks failed in four years and only nine failed in 1934. What can Pia conclude about deposit insurance?
- Insurance made banks safe from failure, since just nine failed afterward
- Failures fell by 9 banks, from about 9,000 in four years to nine in one year
- Insurance caused the drop, since failures fell from over 9,000 to nine as soon as it began in 1934
- Failures fell sharply after insurance began, but the card cannot show insurance alone did it
Unemployment rate, Lebergott's estimates
Year Unemployment rate (percent) 1929 3.2 1930 8.7 1931 15.9 1932 23.6 1933 24.9 Darby's estimate for 1933, which counts work-relief jobs as jobs, is 20.6 percent. No agency in the 1930s collected labor-force data as today's survey does, so these rates are later estimates. Data: Robert A. Margo, Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1993, Table 1.
In which year did the unemployment rate rise most, and what does the 1933 change suggest, Ren asks?
- 1932, up 7.7 points; in 1933 it rose 1.3 points, but slowing is not recovery near 25 percent
- 1932 (up 7.7 percent); in 1933 it rose 1.3 percent, so the rate was 25 percent
- 1931 (up 7.2 points); in 1933 it rose just 1.3 points, which shows recovery had begun in the table
- 1930 (up 5.5 points); in 1933 it fell by 1.3 points, which shows recovery had begun
Lebergott gives 24.9 percent for 1933 and Darby 20.6. Which should Tala use to judge how many lacked private jobs, and why?
- Darby's, since relief workers had jobs and so were not unemployed in any sense
- Neither, since estimates that differ by four points cannot tell anything about 1933
- Neither alone: Lebergott shows people without any job, Darby counts relief workers as employed
- Lebergott's, since he counts relief workers as unemployed, which fits lacking a private job
Use this
Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card C, banks, 1930 to 1934 (Summary in our words, not a quotation): Banks outside the Federal Reserve System had little access to cash in a crisis. From the fall of 1930 through the winter of 1933 the money supply fell by nearly 30 percent, and prices fell with it. President Roosevelt ordered all banking transactions suspended on March 6, 1933, and banks reopened from March 13. Some 4,000 banks that closed in 1933 never reopened. Deposit insurance began on January 1, 1934, with coverage up to $2,500 an account. Only nine banks failed in 1934, compared with more than 9,000 in the four years before.
Card C says the money supply fell nearly 30 percent and prices fell with it. How did that deepen unemployment, Zee asks?
- Falling prices made debts heavier and cut firms' sales, so firms laid off workers
- Falling prices made goods cheaper, so people bought less because they distrusted lower prices
- Falling prices caused the bank holiday, so unemployment rose after banks closed
- Falling prices put firms out of business, so each worker was laid off
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Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card B, two views of bank failures (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): Some Fed leaders followed Bagehot's rule that a central bank should lend to solvent banks in a panic. Others held a "liquidationist" view that weak institutions should be let fail, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon advocated it. The Fed's history says modern monetary scholars believe the Fed could have stemmed the contraction, and that its expansions of the monetary base in 1931 and 1932 were "too little and too late." It also calls the Fed's efforts "well intentioned and based on the best available information."
Card B says modern scholars think the Fed could have stemmed the contraction. What does that do to the claim that the crash caused the Depression, Ari asks?
- It shifts weight toward policy choices after the crash, though the crash can be one cause
- It ends the claim, since policy alone explains the Depression
- It strengthens the claim, since a Fed that could not have acted shows the crash was too large
- It has no effect, since scholars today cannot know what a Fed in 1930 could have done
Use this
Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card A, the gold standard and the Fed (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): The international gold standard linked interest rates and monetary policies among the nations that took part in it. The Fed's rate increases of 1928 and 1929 therefore triggered recessions in countries around the world. The Fed's history adds that some officials judged that defending the gold standard by raising rates was better for the economy than aiding ailing banks. Card B, two views of bank failures (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): Some Fed leaders followed Bagehot's rule that a central bank should lend to solvent banks in a panic. Others held a "liquidationist" view that weak institutions should be let fail, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon advocated it. The Fed's history says modern monetary scholars believe the Fed could have stemmed the contraction, and that its expansions of the monetary base in 1931 and 1932 were "too little and too late." It also calls the Fed's efforts "well intentioned and based on the best available information."
Card A: some officials put the gold standard before aiding banks. Card B: scholars say the Fed could have stemmed the contraction. How do they fit, Esme asks?
- They conflict, since card A says aiding banks was better and card B says it was not, so one card must be wrong
- Together they show the gold standard itself failed in 1929, which caused the contraction
- Together they suggest the Fed put the gold standard first, a choice scholars now judge costly
- Together they show the Fed deliberately caused the Depression to protect the gold standard
Use this
Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card B, two views of bank failures (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): Some Fed leaders followed Bagehot's rule that a central bank should lend to solvent banks in a panic. Others held a "liquidationist" view that weak institutions should be let fail, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon advocated it. The Fed's history says modern monetary scholars believe the Fed could have stemmed the contraction, and that its expansions of the monetary base in 1931 and 1932 were "too little and too late." It also calls the Fed's efforts "well intentioned and based on the best available information."
The Fed's history calls the Fed's efforts 'well intentioned and based on the best available information.' How should Jun weigh that line, using the rest of card B?
- As settled, because a central bank has the strongest information about its own choices
- As a quotation from the 1930s, because the words describe officials' intentions then
- As the Fed's own judgment of itself: useful, but set beside scholars' view that it could have done more
- As worthless, because an institution judging itself will usually praise itself and so cannot be trusted
Use this
Causes in dispute, 1928 to 1934 (cards A to C and a table). Card A, the gold standard and the Fed (Summary in our words, not a quotation, from the Federal Reserve History): The international gold standard linked interest rates and monetary policies among the nations that took part in it. The Fed's rate increases of 1928 and 1929 therefore triggered recessions in countries around the world. The Fed's history adds that some officials judged that defending the gold standard by raising rates was better for the economy than aiding ailing banks. Card C, banks, 1930 to 1934 (Summary in our words, not a quotation): Banks outside the Federal Reserve System had little access to cash in a crisis. From the fall of 1930 through the winter of 1933 the money supply fell by nearly 30 percent, and prices fell with it. President Roosevelt ordered all banking transactions suspended on March 6, 1933, and banks reopened from March 13. Some 4,000 banks that closed in 1933 never reopened. Deposit insurance began on January 1, 1934, with coverage up to $2,500 an account. Only nine banks failed in 1934, compared with more than 9,000 in the four years before.
Kira's classmate says the Depression was American, since the stock crash and bank failures were American. What does card A let Kira reply?
- The classmate is wrong, because the gold standard caused the Depression in America first
- The classmate is wrong, because no American event had any effect on other countries
- The classmate is right, because card C lists American banks and so just Americans suffered
- Card A shows the Fed's rate rises reached other countries through the gold standard, so it spread