The Vietnam War and how Americans saw it

Grade 11 Social Studies Worksheet - Challenge Me

Circle the best answer.

1. Read this first

   Use this

   Cards A to D. Card A, President Lyndon B. Johnson, statement on signing the Southeast Asia resolution, August 10, 1964 (primary source; Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 302), to say what the resolution meant: "To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply. To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it. In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way." Card B, a summary in our words, written today (National Archives): Johnson, and later Nixon, treated the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as their legal authority for military policy in Vietnam. Of the two reported attacks, the August 2 attack is confirmed; a National Security Agency report made public in 2007 concluded that the reported August 4 attack never happened. Many people later came to feel that Congress had been misled. Congress repealed the resolution in January 1971, in an attempt to limit Nixon's power to continue the war. Card C, the Southeast Asia Resolution, section 3, August 7, 1964 (primary source; Public Law 88-408; 78 Stat. 384), to say when the resolution would end: "Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution [a vote of both houses that the President does not sign] of the Congress." Card D, a summary in our words, written today: On August 7, 1964, the House voted yes unanimously on the resolution, and two senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, cast the only no votes.

2. 1.

   Card D shows a near-unanimous vote; card B says the August 4 attack never happened. A student says the vote shows members were sure of both attacks. What do the cards support, Ari asks?

   • The student is right, since just two senators and no House members voted no
   • The vote shows what Congress decided, not what each member believed about the attacks
   • Members voted yes knowing the August 4 report would later be doubted
   • The vote reflected Johnson's promise of 'no territory' in card A, which members had heard
3. 2.

   Card C lets Congress end the resolution early by concurrent resolution; card B says Congress repealed it in January 1971. A student calls the repeal that route. What do the cards support, Bo asks?

   • The president ended it under card C, since he decides when peace is assured
   • Congress ended it in 1971, but card B does not say it used the route in card C
   • The resolution expired in 1971 under its own terms, so the repeal merely recorded that
   • The repeal was the concurrent resolution of card C, since both end the resolution early

4. Use this

   Cards E to I. Card E, the War Powers Resolution, section 5(b), November 7, 1973 (primary source; Public Law 93-148; 87 Stat. 556), to set the sixty-day limit: "Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States." Card F, a made-up example for this sheet, not a real document: A president sends Congress a report on March 1 about sending U.S. forces into hostilities. Congress is able to meet, but it does not declare war, pass an authorization or extend the period. Count March 2 as day 1. Card G, President Richard M. Nixon, veto message, October 24, 1973 (primary source; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 29, 1973), to explain why he would not sign the War Powers Resolution: "House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation. I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional." Card H, a summary in our words, written today: Supporters in Congress said the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, and that the War Powers Resolution would make sure Congress shared in decisions about sending forces into hostilities. The member who wrote the bill said its aim was to let Congress use its full constitutional role in decisions about peace and war. Some members thought the bill was too weak, because it let a president continue an action for 60 days. Card I, a summary in our words, written today: President Nixon returned House Joint Resolution 542 without his approval on October 24, 1973. On November 7, 1973, the House voted 284 to 135 and the Senate voted 75 to 18 to override the veto, and the resolution became Public Law 93-148.

5. 3.

   A student says the override votes in card I show Congress had settled that the law was constitutional, against Nixon's objection in card G. What do cards G, H and I support, Esme asks?

   • The student is right, since margins of 284 to 135 and 75 to 18 settle the constitutional question
   • The override made it law, but a vote shows Congress's will, not that Nixon's objection failed
   • The student is right, since Nixon raised his objection after the override and Congress had answered it
   • The student is wrong, since Nixon's message shows that the law was unconstitutional, as he stated

6. Use this

   Cards J to P. Card J, a summary in our words, written today: Students in Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands to school in a quiet protest of the Vietnam War. The principal warned that students who did so would be suspended, and some were. The Supreme Court ruled 7 to 2 for the students on February 24, 1969. The majority said students and teachers keep their free-speech rights at school, and that officials cannot ban speech only because they suspect it might disrupt learning. The dissent said the First Amendment is not a right to speak any opinion at any moment, that students are in school to learn, and that officials need broad authority to keep order. It called the armbands a distraction. Card K, a summary in our words, written today: In a television address on November 3, 1969, President Nixon spoke to "the great silent majority" of Americans and asked for their support for his plan to end the war. His own account of that support came from him, not from a count of the public. Card L, President Gerald R. Ford, remarks at Tulane University, New Orleans, April 23, 1975 (primary source; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Apr. 28, 1975), to speak about the nation's future: "Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned. As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the Nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence." Card M, a summary in our words, written today: On April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese tanks reached the Presidential Palace in Saigon, and the war effectively ended. Card N, a table, "Was it a mistake to send troops to fight in Vietnam?" Gallup, percent (mistake, not a mistake, no opinion): January 23 to 28, 1969: 52, 39, 9. September 17 to 22, 1969: 58, 32, 10. January 15 to 20, 1970: 57, 33, 10. May 21 to 26, 1970: 56, 36, 8. May 14 to 17, 1971: 61, 28, 11. Card O, a table, U.S. troops in South Vietnam on December 31 and deaths during the year (Department of Defense; National Archives record counts, not official statistics): 1968, 536,100 and 16,899; 1969, 475,200 and 11,780; 1970, 334,600 and 6,173; 1971, 156,800 and 2,414; 1972, 24,200 and 759; 1973, fewer than 250 and 68. Card P, a table, deaths of U.S. military personnel by home state of record (National Archives; record counts, not official statistics; all home states and territories together, 58,220): Arizona, 619; West Virginia, 733; Ohio, 3,094; Texas, 3,415; New York, 4,119; California, 5,575.

7. 4.

   Ford said on April 23 the war was 'finished as far as America is concerned' (card L). Card M dates the fall of Saigon to April 30. Which reading fits both cards, Luz asks?

   • Ford spoke on April 30, the day tanks reached the Presidential Palace
   • Ford announced the end of the whole war a week early, since he called it finished
   • Ford spoke knowing Saigon would fall a week later, so his words were already a verdict on the war
   • Ford spoke of America's part in the war; card M puts the war's effective end a week later
8. 5.

   A student says Nixon's 'silent majority' speech (card K) shows most Americans backed his plan. Card N gives five Gallup polls from 1969 to 1971. What do cards K and N allow, Milo asks?

   • The claim holds, since a president would not name a majority without evidence of it
   • The claim holds, since mistake answers in the polls after the speech stayed between 56 and 61
   • No card measures support for his plan; card N asks a different question about sending troops
   • The claim fails, since 58 percent called sending troops a mistake in September 1969

9. Use this

   Cards E to I. Card E, the War Powers Resolution, section 5(b), November 7, 1973 (primary source; Public Law 93-148; 87 Stat. 556), to set the sixty-day limit: "Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States." Card F, a made-up example for this sheet, not a real document: A president sends Congress a report on March 1 about sending U.S. forces into hostilities. Congress is able to meet, but it does not declare war, pass an authorization or extend the period. Count March 2 as day 1. Card G, President Richard M. Nixon, veto message, October 24, 1973 (primary source; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 29, 1973), to explain why he would not sign the War Powers Resolution: "House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation. I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional." Card H, a summary in our words, written today: Supporters in Congress said the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, and that the War Powers Resolution would make sure Congress shared in decisions about sending forces into hostilities. The member who wrote the bill said its aim was to let Congress use its full constitutional role in decisions about peace and war. Some members thought the bill was too weak, because it let a president continue an action for 60 days. Card I, a summary in our words, written today: President Nixon returned House Joint Resolution 542 without his approval on October 24, 1973. On November 7, 1973, the House voted 284 to 135 and the Senate voted 75 to 18 to override the veto, and the resolution became Public Law 93-148.

10. 6.

    A student says the War Powers Resolution let a president use forces as long as he liked, since card H says some thought it too weak. How does card E bear on that, Noah asks?

    • The student is right, since too weak means a president faced no real limit
    • The student is right, since the sixty days stop counting while Congress is out of session
    • Not without limit: after sixty days he must stop unless one of three exceptions applies
    • The student is wrong, since after sixty days nothing but a declaration of war lets the use continue

11. Use this

    Cards A to D. Card A, President Lyndon B. Johnson, statement on signing the Southeast Asia resolution, August 10, 1964 (primary source; Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 302), to say what the resolution meant: "To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply. To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it. In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way." Card B, a summary in our words, written today (National Archives): Johnson, and later Nixon, treated the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as their legal authority for military policy in Vietnam. Of the two reported attacks, the August 2 attack is confirmed; a National Security Agency report made public in 2007 concluded that the reported August 4 attack never happened. Many people later came to feel that Congress had been misled. Congress repealed the resolution in January 1971, in an attempt to limit Nixon's power to continue the war. Card C, the Southeast Asia Resolution, section 3, August 7, 1964 (primary source; Public Law 88-408; 78 Stat. 384), to say when the resolution would end: "Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution [a vote of both houses that the President does not sign] of the Congress." Card D, a summary in our words, written today: On August 7, 1964, the House voted yes unanimously on the resolution, and two senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, cast the only no votes.

12. 7.

    A student says Congress voted in August 1964 on confirmed facts. Card B covers the two reported attacks, and card D reports the vote. How does card B bear on the claim, Pia asks?

    • Partly: August 2 is confirmed, but August 4 was later said not to have happened
    • No, since Congress was misled on purpose, as the later feelings reported in card B show
    • Yes, since card B confirms the attack Congress was told about and the House vote was unanimous
    • Yes, since a vote this wide shows the members had checked the reports

13. Use this

    Cards J to P. Card J, a summary in our words, written today: Students in Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands to school in a quiet protest of the Vietnam War. The principal warned that students who did so would be suspended, and some were. The Supreme Court ruled 7 to 2 for the students on February 24, 1969. The majority said students and teachers keep their free-speech rights at school, and that officials cannot ban speech only because they suspect it might disrupt learning. The dissent said the First Amendment is not a right to speak any opinion at any moment, that students are in school to learn, and that officials need broad authority to keep order. It called the armbands a distraction. Card K, a summary in our words, written today: In a television address on November 3, 1969, President Nixon spoke to "the great silent majority" of Americans and asked for their support for his plan to end the war. His own account of that support came from him, not from a count of the public. Card L, President Gerald R. Ford, remarks at Tulane University, New Orleans, April 23, 1975 (primary source; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Apr. 28, 1975), to speak about the nation's future: "Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned. As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the Nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence." Card M, a summary in our words, written today: On April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese tanks reached the Presidential Palace in Saigon, and the war effectively ended. Card N, a table, "Was it a mistake to send troops to fight in Vietnam?" Gallup, percent (mistake, not a mistake, no opinion): January 23 to 28, 1969: 52, 39, 9. September 17 to 22, 1969: 58, 32, 10. January 15 to 20, 1970: 57, 33, 10. May 21 to 26, 1970: 56, 36, 8. May 14 to 17, 1971: 61, 28, 11. Card O, a table, U.S. troops in South Vietnam on December 31 and deaths during the year (Department of Defense; National Archives record counts, not official statistics): 1968, 536,100 and 16,899; 1969, 475,200 and 11,780; 1970, 334,600 and 6,173; 1971, 156,800 and 2,414; 1972, 24,200 and 759; 1973, fewer than 250 and 68. Card P, a table, deaths of U.S. military personnel by home state of record (National Archives; record counts, not official statistics; all home states and territories together, 58,220): Arizona, 619; West Virginia, 733; Ohio, 3,094; Texas, 3,415; New York, 4,119; California, 5,575.

14. 8.

    Card O gives troops on December 31 and deaths during each year. Troops fell from 536,100 (1968) to 156,800 (1971); deaths from 16,899 to 2,414. Which statement is fair, Ren asks?

    • Deaths fell by the larger share, about 86 percent against about 71, though the counts differ in kind
    • Fewer troops caused the fall in deaths, since both columns fell together in each year to 1973
    • Troops fell more, since they dropped by about 379,000 while deaths dropped by about 14,500
    • Troops fell by the larger share, about 86 percent against about 71 for deaths, as the table shows
15. 9.

    Card P gives deaths by home state of record: West Virginia 733, California 5,575. A student says California's loss was heavier than West Virginia's. What is missing, Tala asks?

    • The year of each death, since deaths in different years cannot be compared
    • Each state's share of the 58,220 total, since a share removes the difference in size
    • The counts for the other states, since a comparison needs a full ranking
    • Each state's population, since counts from states of different size are not rates

16. Use this

    Cards E to I. Card E, the War Powers Resolution, section 5(b), November 7, 1973 (primary source; Public Law 93-148; 87 Stat. 556), to set the sixty-day limit: "Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States." Card F, a made-up example for this sheet, not a real document: A president sends Congress a report on March 1 about sending U.S. forces into hostilities. Congress is able to meet, but it does not declare war, pass an authorization or extend the period. Count March 2 as day 1. Card G, President Richard M. Nixon, veto message, October 24, 1973 (primary source; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Oct. 29, 1973), to explain why he would not sign the War Powers Resolution: "House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation. I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional." Card H, a summary in our words, written today: Supporters in Congress said the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, and that the War Powers Resolution would make sure Congress shared in decisions about sending forces into hostilities. The member who wrote the bill said its aim was to let Congress use its full constitutional role in decisions about peace and war. Some members thought the bill was too weak, because it let a president continue an action for 60 days. Card I, a summary in our words, written today: President Nixon returned House Joint Resolution 542 without his approval on October 24, 1973. On November 7, 1973, the House voted 284 to 135 and the Senate voted 75 to 18 to override the veto, and the resolution became Public Law 93-148.

17. 10.

    In card F (made up), a report is sent March 1 and Congress, able to meet, does nothing. Under card E, by what date must the president stop, Zee asks?

    • May 1, since two months from March 1 is the same as sixty days
    • No date yet, since Congress's silence leaves the use of forces in place
    • April 30, the sixtieth calendar day, since silence from Congress is no exception
    • A later date, since Congress did not meet to extend it, which is the third exception